

INFO	LOG-00	EEB-00	AF-00	AID-00	CIAE-00	COME-00	INL-00
	DODE-00	DOTE-00	PDI-00	DS-00	EAP-00	DHSE-00	FAAE-00
	FBIE-00	VCI-00	H-00	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	L-00
	MOFM-00	MOF-00	M-00	VCIE-00	NEA-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	NIMA-00	PM-00	GIWI-00	P-00	ISNE-00	DOHS-00
	FMPC-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	T-00	NCTC-00	CBP-00
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 AMEMBASSY SANAA
 AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
 AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
 JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T STATE 034041

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2034
 TAGS: [EG](#) [ETTC](#) [IR](#) [JO](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [SU](#) [SY](#)
 SUBJECT: (S) FOLLOWING UP ON SUSPECTED IRANIAN ARMS
 OVERFLIGHTS

REF: A. (A) STATE 2617
 1B. (B) CAIRO 56
 1C. (C) STATE 24945
 1D. (D) CAIRO 483
 1E. (E) AMMAN 710

Classified By: Classified By: ISN Acting A/S C.S. Eliot Kang,
 E.O. 12958 Reasons 1.4 (b), (c), and (d)

1. (S//NF) SUMMARY: We recently demarched Cairo and Amman (REFS A & C) on possible Iranian attempts to smuggle arms or related material to Hamas on Sudanese aircraft that may transit Egyptian and/or Jordanian airspace on their way from Syria to Sudan. We asked both to consider denying overflight for these aircraft or conditioning approval upon landing for inspection. Despite our requests, subsequent sensitive information) which we do not yet have authorization to share with either country) indicates that at least some of these flights have taken place.

2. (S//NF) We endeavor to share as much relevant information as possible when asking countries to take action on such requests. In this case, however, we were unable to share specific details on flight itineraries, routes, or numbers, cargo contents, or other information that might have facilitated action. Extremely detailed information has often not been necessary, however, for other countries to prevent proliferation-related overflights. National thresholds for action differ depending upon political calculations, domestic legal authorities, and other factors, sometimes on a case-by-case basis.

3. (S//REL EGYPT AND JORDAN) ACTION REQUEST: Post is instructed to approach appropriate-level Egyptian and Jordanian officials to request feedback on earlier US demarches and engage in a dialogue on the information and authorities required to successfully block such overflights in the future. Post may draw from objectives below.

4. (S//REL EGYPT AND JORDAN) OBJECTIVES: Post should:

-- Ask host nation interlocutors whether they received any overflight requests matching the descriptions in our demarches and what, if any, actions they took in response.

-- Confirm if raised that, in such cases, the U.S. makes the same requests of other potential overflight states, as appropriate.

-- Inquire as to the information and/or legal thresholds host nations require in order to deny overflights and/or require landings for inspection before being allowed to proceed.

-- Inquire as to national procedures, including domestic legal authorities and other factors that host nations take into consideration when deciding whether to take action on our requests.

-- Note that the Convention on International Civil Aviation Organization (the Chicago Convention) provides states with the legal authority with respect to unscheduled/charter flights to deny overflight permission where the flights are carrying munitions or implements of war or to request that aircraft land for inspection.

-- Ensure host nations understand that we share as many details as we can about such flights, and emphasize the need to act based on available information.

-- Underline the importance of blocking arms-related overflights from Iran, Syria, or elsewhere in preventing the rearmament of Hamas and thus decreasing the risks of another conflict in Gaza.

-- Reaffirm the need for states to ensure compliance with the prohibition on Iranian arms exports in UNSCR 1747.

-- Highlight the value in blocking arms transfers to Hamas before they reach Sudan via overflight denials vice the greater challenge of attempting to stop overland smuggling from Sudan through Egypt into Gaza and the risk that other means of blocking such shipments might further threaten Sudan's stability.

15. (U) REPORTING REQUIREMENT: Post is requested to report the results of this effort within five business days of receipt of this cable.

16. (U) POINT OF CONTACT: Department point of contact for further information/follow-up is Thomas Zarzecki, ISN/CPI, 202-647-7594, zarzeckitw@state.sgov.gov.

17. (U) Department thanks Posts for their assistance. Please slug all responses for NEA, ISN, AF, and T.

CLINTON